Force-on-Force Attacks: Their Implications For the Defense Of U.S. Nuclear Facilities (1993) By C. Meyer, Jennifer Duncan, Bruce Hoffman
 
This Note presents the results of a study sponsored by the Office of Threat Assessment, US Department of Energy (DOE). The study was undertaken to gain insight into the threat posed by well-armed attackers to DOE nuclear programs. By examining the historical data on 220 reported" force-on-force" attacks, ie, attacks by well-armed adversaries against well-defended targets, this study explores some of the likely characteristics of such a potential assault against nuclear facilities or programs. Three key attributes of force-on-force attacks are analyzed: the characteristics of the attackers, their means of attack, and their targets. Since these attributes have been extrapolated from an examination and analysis of assaults by well-armed attackers against well-defended targets, this study may also be useful to those interested in force-on-force attacks in general. The work was carried out in the International Security and Defense Strategy Program of RAND's National Security Research Division under a project entitled “Force-on-Force Attacks and the Threat to DOE Nuclear Facilities."
 
Soft Cover
48 Pages
In Fair to Good Condition